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Abstract
We develop a simple model of borrowing and lending within the mone-
tary union. We characterize the default decision of the borrowing country
and explore the impact that the monetary union has on the amount of
borrowing, the rate of interest and the default probability. The key as-
sumptions of the modelling strategy are that in the monetary union, the
lender is risk averse with monopoly power rather than risk neutral with
perfect competition. We find that the borrowing member country of the
monetary union borrows more at cheaper cost vis-a`-vis a standalone bor-
rowing country. Further, we find that forming a monetary union with high
initial income disparity between the member countries leads to more and
cheaper borrowing and higher default probabilities.
∗I am extremely grateful to Salvador Ortigueira for his guidance and support. I would
like to thank Manuel Santos, Andre´s Erosa, Matthias Kredler, Abderrahim Tammouti, Juan
Pablo Rincon Zapatero, Sandra Lizarazo, Raphael Boleslavsky, Herna´n Seoane and all sem-
inar/conference participants at the UC3M and University of Miami for their comments and
suggestions; to Manuel Santos and University of Miami for their hospitality.
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1 Introduction
The third stage of the European Economic Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 led to
the adoption of the Euro as a common currency among member countries and to
their surrendering of national monetary policy in favour of the European Central
Bank. The adoption of the Euro triggered a dramatic increase in external net
borrowing among peripheral countries such as Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
The main lenders to these countries were France and Germany which together
held around 45% of the Portuguese and the Spanish debt during the period 2001-
2013. More specifically, around 77% of the French debt holdings were issued by
countries of the European Union and 67% were issued by Eurozone countries.
Likewise, 77% of the German debt holdings were issued by the European Union
countries and 66% were issued by the Eurozone. The financial crisis of 2008,
along with the above-mentioned high exposure of France and Germany to the
debt of peripheral countries, increased the risk of default among the borrowing
countries and led to the Greek debt crisis of 2010.
In this paper we present a model of borrowing and lending to study how a
monetary union shapes the amount of borrowing, its price and the default prob-
ability. In particular, we investigate how the debt market responds to changes in
both the costs and benefits associated with a monetary union. Our framework is
also useful to shed light on how high initial income disparity between countries in
a monetary union affects borrowing, lending and default. This is a question that
has gained recent attention in light of the debt crisis of peripheral countries. Our
model builds on existing literature on debt default (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1981
and Arellano, 2008). We extend this literature by introducing a monetary union
which we model as a technology that changes the income processes of the member
countries. We describe a simple economy with two countries that receive exoge-
nous income streams every period. Debt contracts are not enforceable and hence
the borrowing country can choose to default on its debt. In case of default, the
union breaks and both countries revert to autarky without any future interaction
in the international credit market. A second main departure from the previous
literature is that we model the lender as being risk averse with monopoly power,
instead of a continuum of risk neutral lenders operating in a perfectly competitive
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market. The lender is also subjected to exogenous income shocks, which depend
on whether it belongs to the monetary union or not. We model the benefit of
a monetary union by assuming that the growth rate of income is higher relative
to autarky. We model the cost of a monetary union by assuming higher income
volatility than in autarky. Empirical evidence supporting this modelling strategy
is provided by several papers.
We find that higher amount of borrowing at lower yield formed the equilibrium
in the monetary union vis-a`-vis standalone. Any two standalone countries engage
in borrowing and lending only when the default cost is quite high. The costs and
benefits associated with the monetary union add another level of trade-off with
respect to the default decision. This not only increases the debt supply by the
borrowing country in the monetary union but also increases the amount borrowed
in equilibrium. The model yields additional result that higher income disparity
between member countries leads to more and cheaper borrowing in the monetary
union. The equilibrium outcomes, as were observed in the EMU debt market are
the result of interplay between the market structure and agents’ characteristics.
The results when translated into policy recommendations call for either expanding
the joining criterion to the real variables such as income disparity or developing
tools to counter higher debt issuance when cross country income disparity is
higher.1
2 Some data on borrowing-lending within the
EMU
In this section we present the empirical evidence on borrowing and lending within
the EMU. We focus our attention on the debt securities issued by Greece, Italy,
Portugal and Spain. Specifically, we look at the net lending by France and Ger-
many to the above mentioned countries.
We use data from the International Monetary Fund’s Coordinated Portfolio
1This is line with the optimal currency area literature, seminal work by Robert Mundell
(1961), where convergence of the real variables is crucial for the overall stability of a common
currency area.
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Investment Survey from 2001 till 2013 (CPIS, 2013).2 This is an annual survey
offering data on portfolio investments by the residents of a reporting country in
the debt securities, short- and long-term instruments valued at market prices,
of the issuing country. The CPIS collects data either on a security-by-security
basis or on an aggregate basis.3 It uses a “from-whom-to-whom” approach and
compiles information from either the end-investors or from custodians, or from
a combination of the two. In an end-investor survey, the security owner reports
directly, while in a custodian survey, financial institutions that hold securities
report on behalf of the end-investors.4 The holders of the debt securities are
either general government or financial institutions or non-financial corporations.
General government consists of the central, state and local governments, social
security funds, non-profit institutions and unincorporated enterprises that are
controlled by the government units.5
We focus on short- and long-term debt securities. Short-term debt securities
consist of money market instruments that yield the holder a fixed payment on a
particular date, and that matures in less than a year. These include treasury bills
and notes, commercial and financial paper, and bankers acceptances, negotiable
certificates of deposit, short-term notes issued under note issuance facilities or
revolving underwriting facilities and promissory notes, debt securities that have
been sold under repurchase agreements and debt securities that have been “lent”
under a securities lending arrangement. Long term debt securities consist of
2It is worth noting that both the CPIS and the QEDS (Quarterly External Debt Survey)
are the databases on the private and public external debt. There is a discrepancy between the
aggregate values of the total investment in the debt securities reported by each of them. While
the CPIS reports not only the debt securities holding and the issuing countries but also the
investors’ profile in the reporting country, QEDS has only aggregate information with respect
to the issuing country of the debt.
3A security is defined as a tradable instrument and is identified by the International secu-
rities identification number. We exclude equity securities for our analysis. Equity covers all
instruments which are shares and stocks, participation documents, depository receipts, shares
in mutual funds and investment trusts, securities that have been sold under repurchase agree-
ments, lent under a securities lending arrangement etc. Financial derivatives and related non-
resident enterprises (an enterprise group which has an equity interest of 10% or more or where a
non-resident has more than 10% or more holdings in your group) are excluded from the survey.
4End-investors includes institutional investors, such as banks, security dealers, mutual funds,
and pension and insurance funds. Custodians are also financial institutions but they manage
securities on behalf of domestic residents.
5Governments are majorly the issuers of debt instruments rather than the buyers.
4
bonds, debentures, and notes with maturity longer than a year. These include
“straight” coupon bonds, non-participating preferred stocks or shares, convertible
bonds and bonds with optional maturity dates, negotiable certificates of deposit,
dual currency bonds, zero-coupon bonds and other deep discount bonds, floating
rate bonds (FRNs), indexed bonds (IBs), asset-backed securities (ABSs), euro
medium-term notes, Schuldscheine notes, debentures, bearer depository receipts
denoting ownership of debt securities issued by non-residents, debt securities that
have been sold under repurchase agreements and debt securities that have been
“lent” under a securities lending arrangement.6
We use information on holdings and issuances of debt securities to calculate
ownership percentage which is defined as the share of a lender in the total debt
issuance of the borrower,
Ownership percentage =
debt securities issued by the borrower and owned by a lender
total debt securities issued by the borrower
We also construct exposure percentage, which offers a measure of a lender’s
exposure to the debt securities of a given issuer in its portfolio,
Exposure percentage =
securities issued by a borrower and owned by the lender
total debt securities owned by the lender
We now report net lending by France and Germany to Greece, Italy, Portugal
and Spain from 2001 till 2013. We show net lending for two sub-periods: from
2001 until 2009 and from 2009 until 2013. The first sub-period corresponds to
post-EMU formation and the second sub-period corresponds to the ongoing EMU
debt crisis. Figures 1 to 4 illustrate an increase of more than 400% in net lending
by France to Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain during the first sub-period.7 It
grew from USD 10 bn in 2001 to USD 80 bn in 2009 for Greece; from USD 36
bn in 2001 to USD 207 bn in 2009 for Italy; from USD 8 bn in 2001 to USD 60
bn in 2009 for Portugal and from USD 21 bn in 2001 to USD 175 bn in 2009 for
Spain. The net lending by France stalled at the onset of the EMU debt crisis. It
6FRNs such as perpetual-rate notes, variable-rate notes, structured FRN, reverse FRN, col-
lared FRN, step-up recovery FRN, and range/corridor/accrual notes. IBs such as property
index certificates. ABSs such as collateralized mortgage obligations and participation certifi-
cates.
7The net lending is valued at the market prices.
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fell by 93% for Greece; by 72% for Portugal and by 8% for Spain from 2009 till
2013. Even though, Italy’s debt market recovered immediately after the drop in
2009, the net lending grew at a meagre 9%.
Figures 5 to 8 report net lending by Germany to the aforementioned borrowing
countries. Figure 5 plots net lending to Greece and it increased from USD 14
bn in 2001 to USD 38 bn in 2009, an increase of 156%. Post-debt crisis the net
lending plummeted to USD 7 bn in 2013. While, we observe in figure 6 that net
lending to Italy grew by 250% from 2001 until 2013, it dropped in 2003, 2005 and
2011. Figure 7 and 8 document the increase in net lending to Portugal and Spain
by more than 450 % during the first sub-period. Up until 2002, the net lending
to Spain was negligible; however, by 2007 it reached the peak at USD 178 bn.
During the second sub-period net lending stalled for Portugal and Spain.
We present the evidence in support of two central assumptions of our theo-
retical model: risk averse lenders with monopoly power over the debt securities
market of the borrower. Figures 9 and 10 show the ownership percentage of
France and Germany in the debt issuance of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
Germany remained one of the top holders of the Spanish debt securities with
ownership percentage around 20% from 2001 till 2013. During the same period,
Portuguese debt was held mostly by France with an ownership percentage around
30%.
6
Figure 1: France to Greece Figure 2: France to Italy
Figure 3: France to Portugal Figure 4: France to Spain
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
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Figure 5: Germany to Greece Figure 6: Germany to Italy
Figure 7: Germany to Portugal Figure 8: Germany to Spain
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Figure 9: Germany Figure 10: France
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
The right axis of figures 11 and 12 plots the Portuguese and Spanish total debt
securities and the ownership percentage for major lenders in the debt securities
markets on the left axis.8 We observe that France and Germany held 40-50%
8The figure plots the total debt securities values in logs.
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of the Portuguese and Spanish debt securities consistently from 2001-2013. The
holdings of Spanish debt by the Euro countries dwarf the holdings by non-Euro
countries (US, UK, Japan, Norway and rest of the world). We measure the
Portuguese and Spanish debt market concentration by calculating the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI).9 Table 1 reports the HHI for all lenders and for the Euro
zone lenders, which participated in the Portuguese and Spanish debt market.
The HHI shows that debt markets have been moderately concentrated within the
Eurozone countries.
Figures 13 and 14 plot the exposure percentages for France and Germany.
On the left axis we document six of the debt issuing countries for which the
exposure percentage was more than 5% from 2001 till 2013. The debt portfolio
of France and Germany consist of securities issued by Italy, Netherlands, Spain,
the United Kingdom and the United States. France and Germany also invested
in each other’s debt securities. On the right axis we plot the total debt held by
France and Germany with exposure percentage greater than 1%.10 France and
Germany had huge exposure to the debt securities of few countries. They held
more than 75% of the debt securities issued by member countries of the European
Union and more than 65% of the debt securities issued by the Eurozone countries.
Further, more than 90% of the debt securities was issued by the European Union
countries, Japan, United States and United Kingdom alone.
9HHI is a measure of the size of a lender in relation to the overall market. It is the sum of
square of the market share of all the players. It ranges from close to zero to 10,000. A higher
number indicates less competitive market.
10In the case of Germany, debt securities of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom,
United States, Japan, Cayman Islands, Jersey and International Organizations.
France held securities of Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States,
Japan, Cayman Islands, International Organizations.
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Figure 11: Spain Figure 12: Portugal
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Years Spain Portugal
All lenders Euro Zone All lenders Euro Zone
2001 947 1643 1283 2017
2002 1114 1778 1472 2182
2003 1268 2003 1577 1931
2004 1274 1900 1429 1926
2005 1347 1993 1386 1865
2006 1280 1973 1372 1834
2007 1266 2026 1359 1943
2008 1266 2057 1434 1894
2009 1276 2022 1540 2041
2010 1382 2159 1674 2096
2011 1269 1961 1259 1726
2012 1290 1917 1388 1768
2013 1317 1918 1327 1613
Table 1: Herfindahl-Hirschman index
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
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Figure 13: Germany Figure 14: France
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
3 The Environment
In the following section we will consider an economy with two countries, i ∈ {l, b},
which are inhabited by risk averse households of unit mass each. The households
are identical within each country. Time t is discrete and infinite with lending
and borrowing taking place in period, t = 1. There are two alternate regimes
in our analysis, j ∈ {m, k}, where m represents the monetary union and k the
autarky. The monetary union can be thought of as a technology that increases a
country’s potential income (higher trend) at the cost of giving up the ability to
smooth income shocks (higher volatility).
Households The preferences of the representative household in country i are
E1
∞∑
t=1
βt−1i u(c
j
i,t), (1)
where βi ∈ (0, 1) is the household discount factor and cji,t is the consumption of
the household in country i when it is in regime j in period t. The utility function
is strictly increasing and concave, i.e. u′(.) > 0 and u′′(.) < 0 and satisfies
the standard Inada conditions. Households receive a stochastic endowment, yji,t,
every period and a lump sum transfer of goods from its government, at.
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The income process When country i is in regime j at any period t, income
(endowment) follows the process,
log(yji,t+1) = α
j
i .(t+ 1) + ρilog(y
j
i,t) + 
j
i,t+1, (2)
where, the trend parameter αji is positive, the persistence parameter ρi is within
the unit circle and the income shocks ji,t+1 are i.i.d and normally distributed
N(0, ςji
2). ςji is the standard deviation of the income shocks.
The income trend is higher for the member countries in the monetary union,
which is attained through channels such as reduction in transaction costs, en-
hanced trade, financial deepening, seigniorage gains etc. (Papaioannou and
Portes, 2008 and Frankel and Rose, 2002). At the same time, a higher income
volatility is observed for the member countries on account of losing the monetary
policy discretion (Luque et al., 2014 and OECD, 1999) and use of a single mon-
etary policy when faced with asymmetric shocks across the member countries
(Werning and Farhi, 2012). Thus,
αmi > α
k
i and ς
m
i > ς
k
i for i ∈ {l, b} (3)
Governments The government of each country is benevolent and maximizes
the utility of the representative household. In period t = 1 both countries are
in the monetary union. They can smooth their consumption by trading a non-
contingent bond which pays a time- and state-invariant return. We assume that
βb < βl, so that country b is the net borrower and country l is the net lender.
Also, we assume that the two countries have some initial asset/liability, a1, which
has to be repaid by the borrowing country in period t = 1.
Borrowing and Lending In period t = 1, the borrowing country borrows
an amount a2 at a given discount q2, from the lending country.
11 The borrowing
country lacks commitment to repay its debt obligation in period t=2. The default
is an absorbing state, following which the monetary union breaks. The borrowing
11Note here, q2 represents the bond price or the discount at which the bond is sold and
1
q2
represents the interest rate for the same bond.
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country is immediately penalized with γ fraction of its income realization in
period t = 2. If however the debt is repaid, the monetary union continues to
exist.
In Section 2 we provided the evidence that in the EMU only a few lending
countries held most of the debt securities issued by the borrowing countries (CPIS,
2013). We follow this empirical finding and assume, for simplicity, that the single
lending country is the sole source of borrowing and it has the monopoly power
over the lending market instead of a continuum of lenders in a competitive market.
In period t = 1, the lender chooses the bond price q2 for a given debt. It remains
in the monetary union if the borrowing country repays the debtin period t = 2.
3.1 Evidence on the “monetary union” technology
The “monetary union” is modelled as a technology, which allows member coun-
tries attain a higher long run growth in income at the expense of a higher income
volatility. This reduced form definition of the monetary union captures parsimo-
niously the benefits and the costs of adopting a common currency.
In this section we assess the effects that the launch of the euro has on its
member countries. Generally speaking, a monetary union benefits its members
directly and indirectly through trade and financial market deepening. A common
currency lowers the transaction costs, reduces price uncertainty and enhances
the price transparency. At the same time adopting a common currency not only
takes discretionary monetary policy away from each member country but also
leave them facing asymmetric shocks with a single union-wide monetary policy.12
Frankel and Rose (2002) use a two-stage approach to quantify the effects of
monetary unions on income through trade. They use cross-sectional data from
over 180 countries for the period from 1970 until 1995. They provide econometric
evidence that a monetary union triples trade. Further, an increase in total trade-
to-GDP ratio by one percent raises income per capita by at least one-third of a
percent.13
There are several papers estimating particularly the effect of the euro on trade.
12For a textbook treatment refer to De Grauwe (2012).
13The first estimate on the effect of currency unions on trade is larger if the currency union
partnership has linguistic, historical, political and geographical links.
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In a survey of the literature by Baldwin (2006), he concludes that the euro led
to an increase in trade by five to ten percent within the euro area. Micco et al.
(2003) use a panel data for 15 Euro countries from 1992 to 2002 and apply the
difference-in-differences estimate approach. They find that the effect of the euro
on trade between member countries is between 4-10%. The monetary union also
enhances trade with non-Euro countries. Flam and Nordstro¨m (2006) estimate
the increase in trade by 15% within the Euro area and by 8% with the other EU
countries from 1989-2002 until 1998-2002.
Another channel which influences the output growth is through internation-
alization of the Euro. It reaps benefits to the monetary union in the form of
seigniorage and expansion of the financial markets. Papaioannou and Portes
(2008) discuss the positive effect of Euro adoption on deepening and integration
of the financial markets. The financial market development affects the economic
performance through channels such as risk sharing, lowering cost of capital, fast
reallocation of investments etc.
We use data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) database to calculate three-year averages of the real GDP’s annual
growth rates for France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, before and
after joining the Euro.14 We observe that after joining the Euro the annual growth
rate increased from 3.8% to 4.5% for Greece; from 1.5% to 2.3% for Italy; from
3.6% to 4.5% for Spain; from 2.4% to 3.1% for France and from 1.5% to 2.2% for
Germany but it declined from 4.2% to 3.2% for Portugal.
Regarding the income volatility, Luque et al. (2014) report average volatilities
of GDP per capita before and after the adoption of the euro for the periods, 1986-
1998 and 1999-2011. They document that average volatilities increased after 1999
for almost all member countries. It increased from 6.67% to 14.94% for Greece;
from 10.63% to 13.5% for Italy; from 19.38% to 23% for Portugal; from 9.54% to
18.91% for Spain and from 4.6% to 7.8% for France. However, it declined from
5.61% to 4.02% for Germany.
One of the explanations behind this increase in income volatility is that some
14France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain joined the Eurozone in 1999 while Greece
joined in 2001. For details on data refer to FRED or OECD (http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/data-
00052-en).
14
member countries not only had high inflation variance historically but also were
structurally different from other member countries. After adopting a common
currency it is impossible to adjust the exchange rate in order to accommodate
the inflation variation. Thus a union-wide single monetary policy would lead to
higher output variability. Another mechanism leading to the increase in output
volatility is that asymmetric shocks across member countries cannot be targeted
by a single monetary policy (Lane, 2012; Shambaugh et al., 2012 and Werning
and Farhi, 2012).15
3.2 Characterization of borrowing and lending
We solve the model by using the method of backward induction. We consider
three distinct stages. In the first stage, the borrower takes the decision of default
or repayment, given the amount of debt, a2, and the price, q2, paid for this
amount. In the second stage, the borrower anticipates the default probability,
δ(a2, q2), and chooses the amount of debt, a2(q2), given the price, q2. Finally, in
the last stage, the lender determines the price, q2, to offer, with the anticipation
of both the default probability, δ(q2), and the debt amount, a2(q2).
Let us denote the value function of the borrowing country in period t = 1 as
Vb,1. The maximization problem of the borrowing country is,
Vb,1 = Max{a2}
{
u(ymb,1 − a1 + a2q2) + βbE1
[
Max
d2∈{0,1}
I{d2=1}V kb,2 + I{d2=0}V mb,2
]}
,
(4)
where I is the indicator function, d2 represents borrowing country’s decision to
default (d2 = 1) or repay (d2 = 0) and it depends on the income realization in
period t = 2. V kb,2 and V
m
b,2 are the value functions of the borrower in period t = 2
associated with the default and the repayment decision.
V mb,2 = u(y
m
b,2 − a2) + βbE2
[
V mb,3
]
and V kb,2 = u((1− γ)ymb,2) + βbE2
[
V kb,3
]
,
15For a discussion on the effect of the Euro through a political economy channel see Fratzscher
and Stracca (2009).
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where, V kb,3 and V
m
b,3 are the continuation values of the borrower in period t = 3
in the two monetary regimes and are discussed in detail later.
The value function of the lending country in period t = 1 is denoted by Vl,1.
The maximization problem of the lending country is
Vl,1 = Max{q2}
{
u(yml,1 + a1 − a2q2) + βlE1
[
I{d2=1}V kl,2 + I{d2=0}V ml,2
]}
, (5)
where V kl,2 and V
m
l,2 are the value functions of the lending country in period t = 2
corresponding to the default and the repayment decision of the borrowing country.
V ml,2 = u(y
m
l,2 + a2) + βlE2
[
V ml,3
]
and V kl,2 = u(y
m
l,2) + βlE2
[
V kl,3
]
,
where, V kl,3 and V
m
l,3 are the continuation values of the lender in period t = 3.
Continuation Value For all the periods t > 2, the lending and the borrowing coun-
try receive utility from consuming the income. The income realizations depend
on the regimes that they are in, i.e. whether the borrowing country defaulted
and remained forever as standalone or repaid the debt and remained forever in
the monetary union. For a given i and j, let E2
[
V ji,3
]
= V˜ ji , be the expectation
of continuation value of period t = 3 when in period t = 2.
Under the case of CRRA preferences, for a given i and j, the continuation
value is16
V˜ = V˜ (β, σ, ρ, ς, α, y2).
Specifically, for the logarithmic preferences the continuation value is,
V˜ =
[
ρlog(y2)
1−βρ +
α
1−βρ
3−2β
(1−β)2
]
.
16The super and sub-scripts, i and j are suppressed for more clarity. The functional form of
V˜ (β, σ, ρ, ς, α, y2) is described in the appendix.
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Result 1 When the output trend is strictly positive, the continuation value V˜ ji
exist iff σi ≥ σ˜i, where 0 ≤ σ˜i < 1.
Proof in Appendix.
Decision of default/ repayment at period t = 2 We consider the default
decision of the borrowing country for a given borrowed amount, a2 and price,
q2. The borrowing country chooses to repay the loan in period t = 2, depending
on whether the value of repayment is greater than the value of default in period
t = 2, i.e.
V mb,2 ≥ V kb,2 ⇔ ymb,2 ≥ ŷ, (6)
where Ω˜b = V˜
k
b − V˜ mb and ŷ = ŷ(βb, γ, Ω˜b, a2).
The default decision of the borrowing country depends on the income real-
ization in period t = 2. If the realized income is higher than the threshold, ŷ,
the borrowing country will repay the loan. The income threshold is increasing in
the level of borrowed amount. Alternatively, we can also use the above equation
to define a threshold, â2 = â2(y
m
b,2), at which the borrower is indifferent between
its decision to either default or repay the debt in period t = 2. We define the
repayment set as a set of debts where a2 ≤ â2 and the default set as a set of debts
where a2 ≥ â2.
For the CRRA preferences, the debt level for which the borrower is indifferent
between default and repayment is
â2 = y
m
b,2 −
[
((1− γ)ymb,2)1−σb + βbΩ˜b
] 1
1−σb .
For the logarithmic preferences,
â2 = y
m
b,2
(
1− (1− γ)exp(βbΩ˜b)
)
.
In the proposition below we will see the effect of changes in the parameters
and the income realizations on the debt threshold â2. We assume that in the
17
benchmark economy the borrowing country’s representative household has loga-
rithmic preferences.
Proposition 1 For a borrowing country with logarithmic preferences, everything
else remaining same,
i) a higher difference in the output growth, αmb − αkb , expands the repayment set
(or contracts the default set) for all levels of income,
ii) a higher standalone income realization, ykb,2, leads to contraction of the repay-
ment set (or expansion of the default set),
iii) a higher monetary union income realization, ymb,2, leads to expansion of the
repayment set (or contraction of the default set) if ρb >
1
2
.
Proof in Appendix.
The above results remain robust if the borrowing country has CRRA prefer-
ences. We find that for a coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than one, a
higher amount of debt will be repaid in the monetary union if and only if the
income volatility difference, ςmb − ςkb , is lower. The results are intuitive as the rel-
ative benefits (or the relative costs) associated with the monetary union vis-a`-vis
standalone country goes up (or down), the value of repayment becomes higher
relative to the value of default. Thus, the debt threshold, for which the two
values are same, goes up as well and the repayment region expands. Further, we
find that an increase in the coefficient of relative risk aversion decreases the debt
threshold â2. A higher risk aversion indicates a lower utility due to uncertainty,
ceteris paribus. The value of default goes up for a higher risk aversion and thus
the repayment region shrinks. The evidence in support of these assertions are
provided in the appendix.17
We also explore the question whether the borrowing country has a larger
repayment region when it is in the monetary union vis-a`-vis standalone country.
We assume that the default choice of the borrowing country, which is not a
17For any numerical analysis we consider the parameter space where, αmb ∈ [0.015, 0.02],
αkb ∈ [0.0, 0.015], ςmb ∈ [0.0035, 0.007], ςkb ∈ [0, 0.0035], σ ∈ {1, 1.05, 1.15, 2} and the support for
incomes are around 0.85, i.e. ymb,2 ∈ [0.7, 1] and ykb,2 ∈ [0.7, 1].
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member of the monetary union, results in immediate output cost. The income of
the standalone country follows the same process irrespective of its default decision
and thus the continuation values are same.
Proposition 2 In our benchmark economy the default set is smaller under the
monetary union, ceteris paribus.
Proof in Appendix.
Corollory For a given debt level, a2, the ‘indifference’ income threshold is smaller
in the monetary union when the output penalty is small.
Proof in Appendix.
A higher income trend, which is made possible by being in the monetary
union, raises the value of repayment of the member borrowing country. This is
not true in the case of a standalone country and the default region is bigger.
Default probability at period t =1 The borrowing and the lending countries
anticipate default in period t = 1. The borrowing country defaults if and only if
its income realization in period t = 2 is lower than the income cutoff, i.e. ymb,2 ≤ ŷ.
Thus, the default probability is δ2(a2) = Pr
[
ymb,2 ≤ ŷ
]
.
Result 2: The default probability,
δ2(a2) =
1
2
1 + erf
 log
(
ŷ
(ymb,1)
ρbexp(2αmb )
)
√
2ςmb
 , (7)
is non-negative and goes to zero (or one) for a very low (or high) income threshold
ŷ. The default probability is increasing in the borrowed amount, a2.
Proof in Appendix.
In the above formula, erf(.) represents the error function. It is a special
function, which is increasing in its argument and lies between zero and one in its
domain of positive real numbers.
Proposition 3: In our benchmark economy, for a given level of borrowing,
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a2, the default probability is lower in the monetary union vis-a`-vis standalone
countries when the output penalty, γ, is small.
Proof: Using the corollary of Proposition 2, for any given level of debt, a2, it
is immediate that the default probability in monetary union is lower whenever
the output penalty is small. A detailed proof is available in the appendix.
Choice of the level of debt in period t =1 The borrowing country chooses
the amount of debt, given the bond price q2 to maximize its lifetime utility given
in Eq (4).
The debt supply by the borrowing country depends on two debt thresholds,
a2 and a2. The first threshold, a2, corresponds to the case where even if the
borrowing country receives the highest possible income shock, ymb,2 it will default.
Similarly, the second threshold, a2, corresponds to the case where even after
receiving the lowest possible income shock ym
b,2
it will not default. Formally the
debt thresholds are expressed as,
a2 =
{
a2
∣∣V mb,2(ymb,2) < V kb,2(ymb,2)} and a2 = {a2 ∣∣∣V mb,2(ymb,2) ≥ V kb,2(ymb,2)} .
The two thresholds, a2 and a2, divide the debt space into three regions. The
first region is the safe region in which the borrowing country never defaults.
The second region is the risky region with a non-zero default probability. The
borrowing country defaults depending on the income realization in period t = 2.
The last region is the default region where the borrowing country always defaults.
Hence,
δ2 =

0 if a2 ≤ a2,
(0, 1) if a2 > a2 > a2,
1 if a2 ≥ a2.
Given the bond price the borrowing country will borrow an amount in order
to smooth its consumption across periods. We derive the first order condition
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of the borrowing country with logarithmic preferences.18 In this case, the debt
supply function of the borrowing country is given by,
q2 =

βb(ymb,1−a1)E1
[
1
ym
b,2
−a2
]
1−βba2E1
[
1
ym
b,2
−a2
] if a2 ≤ a2,
βb(ymb,1−a1)
∫ ymb,2
ŷ
1
ym
b,2
−a2 dFymb,2
1−βba2
∫ ymb,2
ŷ
1
ym
b,2
−a2 dFymb,2
if a2 > a2 > a2,
0 if a2 ≥ a2.
(8)
The bond price function in period t =1 For a given debt, the lending
country with logarithmic preferences chooses a price which maximizes Eq (5)
subject to q2 being determined by Eq (8). The first order condition of the lender’s
maximization problem is,
∂q2
∂a2
a2 + q2
yml,1 + a1 − a2q2
=

βlE1
[
1
yml,2+a2
]
if a2 ≤ a2,
βlE1
[
(1−δ2)
yml,2+a2(q
∗
2)
− δ′2(V ml,2 − V kl,2)
]
if a2 > a2 > a2,
0 if a2 ≥ a2.
(9)
3.3 Equilibrium
Definition: A monopolistic equilibrium with two countries–a lender and a
borrower–is defined as a set of policy functions for debt supply, a2(q2); default
decision, δ̂2(q2); price of debt, q2; each agents’ consumption in every period for a
specific monetary regime,
{
cml,1, c
m
l,2, c
m
l,3, c
k
l,3, c
m
b,1, c
m
b,2, c
m
b,3, c
k
b,3
}
, such that:
18We apply the Leibniz’s rule for deriving the F.O.C. in the risky region. Note that V mb,2(ŷ) =
V kb,2(ŷ).
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(i) Taking default decision and debt supply,
{
δ̂2(q2), a2(q2)
}
as given, price of
debt, {q2} solves lender’s maximization problem in period t = 1.
(ii) Taking price of debt, {q2} as given, the default decision,
{
δ̂2(q2)
}
at time
t = 2 and the choice of debt supply, {a2(q2)}, at time t = 1 maximizes
borrower’s utility in period t = 1.
(iii) The resource constraints of the economy are satisfied every period.
3.4 An Example
The example in this section simplifies the full model and uses a stylized economy
to illustrate the key results of the model. All the features of the full model are
retained but two. First, the continuation values associated with the future are
now restricted to only period t = 3. Second, the income shocks of the lender
and the borrower are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with two
income states. We further assume that the lender and the borrower are risk averse
with CRRA preferences and receive lower income state shock in period t = 1.
We set the values to parameters in our example as follows. The risk aversion
parameters, σb and σl, of the borrower and the lender are assumed to be 3 and
2, respectively. The default output loss is set around 5%.19 The lender and the
borrower are assumed to be equally patient with the discount factor, βb = βl =
0.98. The initial debt level is a1 =1.3. The two state income shocks for the
monetary union and the standalone countries are set at
{
ym, ym
}
= {4, 12} and{
yk, yk
}
= {4.5, 5}, respectively. We assume that the income structure is same
for the lender and the borrower. In both of the monetary regimes, the probability
of receiving a low income shock is 1%.
Figure 15 plots the debt supply as a function of the bond price and also de-
picts the corresponding equilibrium price and quantity (represented by the black
dot). The three shaded regions are associated with repayment and default. The
light grey region corresponds to the safe region and debt issued within this range
is always repaid. The middle region is the risky region with default risk. The
last and the dark grey region is the default region. The borrowers supply of debt
19In literature this may vary from 1-5%. Conesa and Kehoe (2012).
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is increasing in the bond price within the safe and risky region. However, in the
default region the borrower always supplies maximum amount of debt. The equi-
librium debt and price for the given parameter space is {a∗2, q∗2} = {3.71, 0.0392}.
As we increase the initial income of the lender from the low state to the high
state, the new equilibrium shifts to {a∗2, q∗2} = {3.75, 0.0399}, depicted by the
grey dot. The default probability remains same for both the equilibriums, which
is the probability of receiving the low income shock, and does not depend on
the debt supplied due to i.i.d. income structure. Further, we also evaluate the
scenario when the two countries are standalone, where
{
ym, ym
}
=
{
yk, yk
}
, and
assess the debt market as compared to when they are in the monetary union. In
this example we find that under the assumption of standalone countries the two
economies do not borrow or lend to each other.
Figure 15: Debt supply and Equilibrium
3.5 Monetary union vis-a`-vis non-Monetary union
We are interested in comparing the borrowing and lending behaviour in two
monetary regimes: Monetary union and non-Monetary union. The first regime
refers to the one described above where in period t = 1 the countries are in
the monetary union. The income of the member countries incorporates both the
benefits and the costs of being in the monetary union. In the second regime,
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countries are not the members of the monetary union in period t = 1 and follow
the income processes of a standalone.
In order to analyse the borrowing and lending behaviour, we solve the model
numerically under a specific parameter space as described in Table 2. We assume
that the lending and the borrowing countries have logarithmic preferences. We
follow the literature to assign values to the parameters in the model, βb, βl, ρb,
ρl and γ. In this economy, we assume that the income trend and volatility are
same for the borrowing and the lending countries when in a particular monetary
regime. The borrowing country’s initial income and debt are set such that it has
positive initial wealth, ymb,1 − a1 > 0. We assume that the initial income of the
lending country is higher than the initial income of the borrowing country.
When the default output cost is low, as in Table 2, a standalone borrowing
country supplies either no or very high debt. As a result, we observe no borrowing
and lending in equilibrium. For a very high default output cost, at 70%, the
standalone borrowing country supplies a positive amount of debt (Figure 16). The
former case illustrates that the monetary union by itself promote borrowing and
lending amongst the member countries. The latter case, even though unrealistic,
strengthens the above argument and emphasizes the key role that the monetary
union plays, i.e. it facilitates borrowing and lending with lower debt yields even
though the default probability is higher (refer to Result 2).
Parameter Description Value
αm Income trend (MU) 3%
αk Income trend (non MU) 2%
ςm Income volatility (MU) 8%
ςk Income volatility (non MU) 2%
ym1,b Borrower’s initial income 5
ym1,l Lender’s initial income 8
γ Default output cost 1%
ρb Borrower’s income persistence 0.98
ρl Lender’s income persistence 0.98
βb Borrower’s discount factor 0.7
βl Lender’s discount factor 0.98
a1 Initial debt 4.8
Table 2: Baseline economy
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Figure 16: Debt supply with high default output cost
4 A cross country income disparity
We now turn our attention to another important question, which we address in
this paper: Does forming the monetary union with high initial income disparity
between the member countries influences the debt market equilibrium outcome?
We use the baseline economy as reported in Table 2. We change the income
trend parameter in the monetary union to αm = 6% for illustrative purpose. In
the first step, we calculate the debt supply of the borrowing country for a given
price and then compute the equilibrium. Later, we increase the initial income
disparity between the member countries of the monetary union. It is worth stating
that the debt supply will remain unchanged if we change the parameters specific
to the lending country. In the new equilibrium, the richer lending country buys
higher amount of debt issued at lower yield from the borrowing country.
Further, we also find that the lending country with a higher discount factor,
βl, and a lower income persistence, ρl, has similar effects as with an increase in
initial income. Figure 17 plots the debt supply of the borrowing country and
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corresponding debt issuance and its price in the old (represented by the black
dot) and the new (represented by the grey dot) equilibria.
Figure 17: Comparative statics
5 Comparative statics
We perform additional comparative static exercises with respect to the borrowing
country. We change the discount factor, βb, and the income persistence, ρb, of
the borrowing country. A more impatient borrowing country supplies a higher
amount of debt at all levels of price. In equilibrium, higher amount of debt is
issued at a lower price. Figure 18 plots the debt supply and equilibria associated
with the change in the borrowing country’s discount factor in panel (a).
An increase in borrowing country’s income persistence leads to lower debt
supply for higher price and higher debt supply for lower prices. In equilibrium,
both debt issuance and its price increase. However, the new equilibrium has
associated default risk. These changes are illustrated in panel (b) of figure 18.
We also look at the effect of change in initial indebtedness of the borrower.
A higher initial debt increases the amount of debt supplied by the borrower. In
equilibrium, the amount of debt issued increases but the bond price reduces. This
result is in line with the theoretical literature, as higher initial debt is associated
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with higher borrowing in the future and has a ‘debt roll-over’ effect. The cost of
borrowing may not necessarily go down as a highly indebted country poses higher
risk of default. Figure 19 plots the debt supplies and respective equilibria.
(a) Discount factor (b) Income persistence
Figure 18: Comparative statics
Figure 19: Initial Indebtedness
6 Concluding Remarks
A monetary union entails both costs and benefits for its member countries and
has profound implications for the overall global economy. The recent debt crisis
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in the peripheral economies of the EMU has highlighted several vulnerabilities of
the union. Our paper explores two main questions: Does being in the monetary
union change the way its debt market evolves? Further, does higher initial income
differential between member countries affect the amount of debt issuance, its price
and incentives to default?
We develop a model of lending and borrowing in the monetary union, which
is based on the endogenous sovereign debt default literature. We have two in-
novations in our framework. First, we introduce a reduced form representation
of the monetary union and second, the lender is assumed to be risk averse with
monopoly power. These key assumptions are based on the findings from several
papers and on our own calculations with data from the IMF’s CPIS and OECD
database.
A monetary union provides another layer of trade-off associated with default
in addition to the standard output default cost. In the event of default, the
borrower has to forgo not only a fraction of the output as penalty but also future
benefits associated with the union. However, it also leads to reduction in income
volatility due to discretion over the monetary policy. Similarly, the default affects
the lender in more than one way. The lender cannot collect the outstanding
amount of debt and faces the consequences of a breakup of the monetary union.
We find that monetary union facilitates existence of the debt market and al-
lows its member countries to borrow and lend more at lower cost of borrowing
under circumstances when it is not possible do so if the countries were stan-
dalones. We also observe in the stylized economy that when the initial income
difference grows between the lending and the borrowing member countries, debt
issuance increases and debt yields drop. We illustrate that similar effects are ob-
served when the lender has incentives to save for future and smooth consumption
inter-temporally, for e.g. with higher discount factor and lower income persis-
tence. A higher initial income not only allows lender to save more today but
also increase the future benefits of staying in the union. Both higher discount
factor and lower income persistence boost saving and mitigate credit rationing.
The lender is able to receive higher monopoly rent today by buying more debt,
which is issued by the borrower, at lower rate of interest and also reap benefits
of staying in the union.
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The changes in borrowing country specific features not only shift the debt sup-
ply but also influence the equilibrium outcome. The borrowing country supplies
higher debt when it is more impatient or indebted. Since these are conducive for
default, higher debt is issued at higher cost of borrowing in equilibrium. For lower
income persistence of the borrower, safe but costlier debt is issued in equilibrium.
Our model is simple but it has interesting implications for the monetary union.
It confirms the growing interest in forming monetary union, as was the case of
the EMU, from the lens of the debt market evolution. It also shows that interplay
between the attributes of the member countries in the monetary union is crucial in
determining the equilibrium of the debt market. We conclude that an empirical
exercise along the lines of our model will help future research shed more light
on the debt market in the monetary union. However, this will require more
frequently reported and longer time series data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Net lending to Spain by Japan, Norway, the USA
and the UK
Japan, Norway, the UK and the USA formed the third biggest group of lenders
owning Spanish debt from 2001-2013. Japan and Norway were net lenders through-
out 2001-2013, while Spain was the net lender to the USA until 2010. The UK
remained a net lender of Spain post-2004 and increased lending after a decline
during the financial crises of 2007-2009. The net lending increased in the first
sub-period from USD 10 bn in 2001 to USD 29 bn for Japan; from USD 3 bn in
2001 to USD 20 bn for Norway and from USD 7 bn in 2001 to USD 20 bn for the
UK. It dropped by 22% for Japan; by 100% for Norway and increased by 136%
for the UK in the second sub-period. The growth patterns in net lending had
similarities between the UK and Norway, which are members of the European
Union, with those of the lending Euro countries.
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Figure A.1: Net Lending
Source: Quarterly External Debt Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff.
A.1.1 Spanish debt securities holder’s profile
Year Financial Sector General government Non-Financial Sector
2013 90.3% 6.6% 3.1%
2012 90.0% 7.3% 2.8%
2011 92.8% 5.3% 1.9%
2010 90.5% 8.1% 1.4%
2009 98.9% 0.1% 1.0%
2008 99.1% 0.0% 0.8%
2007 99.0% 0.0% 0.8%
Table A.1: Germany
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
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Financial Sector:Central Bank, Deposit-taking Corporations, Other Financial Corporations;
Non-Financial Sector: Nonfinancial Corporations, Households and Non-profit institutions
serving households.
Year Financial Sector General government Non-Financial Sector
2013 96.0% 0.8% 3.2%
2012 95.3% 0.6% 4.1%
2011 98.3% 0.8% 0.9%
2010 97.7% 1.3% 0.9%
2009 97.7% 0.8% 1.5%
2008 96.8% 0.9% 1.5%
2007 96.6% 0.8% 2.6%
Table A.2: France
Source: Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (IMF).
Financial Sector:Central Bank, Deposit-taking Corporations, Other Financial Corporations;
Non-Financial Sector: Nonfinancial Corporations, Households and Non-profit institutions
serving households.
A.2 Proofs
Continuation Value for period 3 In this section, we define the functional
form of the continuation value with CRRA preferences. If the borrowing country
chooses to repay (or default) its debt in period t = 2, it recieves income shocks
associated with a monetary union (or standalone country) in period t ≥ 3. So the
continuation values when at period t = 2, for a given i and j, can be evaluated
as follows,
V˜ = E2 [u(c3) + βu(c4) + β
2u(c5) + .......] =
S− 1
1−β
1−σ
Proof of Result 1:
In the above equation, S represents the infinite sum of the sequence, sn,
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S =
∑∞
n=1 sn, where sn = β
n−1y(1−σ)ρ
n
2 e
(1−ρ2n)(1−σ)2ς2
2(1−ρ2) e
(−3ρn−1+n+2ρ −
1−ρn−1
1−ρ )(1−σ)αρ
1−ρ .
For the convergence of the above infinite series, as per the ‘Ratio test’ and using
the property that ρb < 1, βb < 1 and ρ
n → 0 as n → ∞, we need that sn+1
sn
→
βe
α(1−σ)
1−ρ < 1 as n → ∞. This shall be true for a positive growth, α > 0 (since
persistence, ρ < 1) iff σ ≥ σ˜, where, σ˜ < 1. Conversly, we may think that for all
σ < 1 we need α < α ∗ (> 0) and for σ > 1 we need α > α ∗ (< 0)
The continuation value for the benchmark case with logarithmic preferences
is given by,
V˜ = E2 [log(y3) + βlog(y4) + β
2log(y5) + ...]
=
[
ρlog(y2)
1−βρ +
3α
1−βρ +
4βα
1−βρ +
5β2α
1−βρ + ...
]
=
[
ρlog(y2)
1−βρ +
α
1−βρ
3−2β
(1−β)2
]
Decision to Default/Repayment at Period t = 2 For CRRA preferences
and for a given debt, a2, the borrowing country decides to repay the loan in
period t = 2 depending on the following condition:
(ymb,2 − a2)1−σb − ((1− γ)ymb,2)1−σb ≥ βb(1− σb)Ω˜ (10)
where Ω˜b =
Sd−Sr
1−σ
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When the borrower has logarithmic utility,
Ω˜m =
ρb(log(y
k
2 )−log(ym2 ))
1−βbρb +
αkb−αmb
1−βbρ
3−2βb
(1−βb)2
We look at the properties of the function H(ymb,2, a2) = V mb,2(a2)− V kb,2. This is
an increasing function of ymb,2 and we show it below.
H(ymb,2, a2) = log(ymb,2 − a2) + βbV˜ mb − log((1− γ)ymb,2)− βbV˜ kb
= log(
ymb,2−a2
(1−γ)ymb,2
)− βb(V˜ kb − V˜ mb )
Let D = βbρb
1−βbρb > 1 and C =
(3−2β)(αk−αm)
(1−βρ)(1−β)2 .
= −log((1− γ)) + log(ymb,2 − a2)− log(ymb,2) + log((ymb,2)D)− log((ykb,2)Dexp(C))
Notice that ∂H
∂ymb,2
= a2
ymb,2−a2
+ D
ymb,2
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 1:
We provide evidence in support of the above theorem by considering specific
cases when σ ∈ {0.5, 1, 2}. In doing so we seperate the default and repayment
sets based on the risk appetite of the borrower.
For logarithmic preferences, when σ = 1,
â2 = y
m
2
(
1− (1− γ)exp
(
βb
[
ρb(log(y
k
2 )−log(ym2 ))
1−βbρb +
αkb−αmb
1−βbρ
3−2βb
(1−βb)2
]))
First order derivative of â2 w.r.t to the parameters under consideration (ceteris
paribus) are
∂â2
∂αmb
=
βb(1−γ)ym2 (3−2βb)exp(βbΩ˜m)
(1−βbρb)3(1−βb)2 ≥ 0
∂â2
∂αkb
= −βb(1−γ)y
m
2 (3−2βb)exp(βbΩ˜m)
(1−βbρb)3(1−βb)2 ≤ 0
∂â2
∂yk2
= −βb(1−γ)ρby
m
2 exp(βbΩ˜m)
yk2 (1−βbρb)
≤ 0,
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∂â2
∂ym2
= 1 + (1 − γ)exp
(
βbΩ˜
m
)
2βbρb−1
1−βbρb ≥ 0 if βbρb ≥ 12 else it is ambigous.
We know βb < 1 and applying this to our condition we get ρb ≥ 12βb > 12 . This
remains true under the parameter space that we consider.
∂â2
∂γ
= ym2 exp
(
βbΩ˜
m
)
≥ 0,
Next we consider the case for CRRA preferences where σ > 1. The borrowers’
indifference between default and repayment arises when
(ym2 − a2)1−σ − ((1− γ)ym2 )1−σ = β(1− σ)Ω˜b (11)
here (1−σ)Ω˜b = SD−SR and S =
∑∞
n=1 β
n−1y(1−σ)ρ
n
2 e
(1−ρ2n)(1−σ)2ς2
2(1−ρ2) e
(−3ρn−1+n+2ρ −
1−ρn−1
1−ρ )(1−σ)αρ
1−ρ
Thus,the debt level which shall make the borrower indifferent between repay-
ment or default is given by:
⇒ â2 = ym2 −
[
((1− γ)ym2 )1−σ + βb(1− σ)Ω˜b
] 1
1−σ
Let, Cb =
(1−σ)2(1−ρ2nb )
2(1−ρ2b)
> 0 and Zb =
(−3ρn−1b +n+2ρb −
1−ρn−1
b
1−ρb
)(1−σ)ρb
1−ρb > 0 iff σ < 1.
An analysis of the derivatives is presented below for the case when σ = 2.
However, this may be extended to the general case where σb > 1 and the results
hold true. In the special case with σb = 2
â = ym2 − 1
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)
The first order derivative of a2 are given below. Of course, the expressions
below may not be determined or are discontinous if the denominator goes to
zero. However, it is worth stating that the denominator is always non zero in the
parameter and state space we conider.
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∂â2
∂αmb
= −
∑∞
n=1 β
nZb
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≥ 0, unambigously.
∂â2
∂αkb
=
∑∞
n=1 β
nZb
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≤ 0, unambigously.
∂â2
∂ym2
= 1 +
− 1
(1−γ)ym22
+
∑∞
n=1 β
nρnb
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
1+ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≥ 0 in the pa-
rameter space under consideration.
∂â2
∂yk2
= −
∑∞
n=1 β
nρnb
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
1+ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≤ 0, unambigously.
∂â2
∂ς2kb
=
∑∞
n=1 β
nCb
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≥ 0, unambigously.
∂â2
∂ς2mb
= −
∑∞
n=1 β
nCb
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b[
1
(1−γ)ym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≤ 0, unambigously.
∂â2
∂γ
= 1
(1−γ)2ym2
[
1
γym2
+
∑∞
n=1 β
n
(
exp(ς2kb Cb+Zbαkb)
(yk2 )
ρn
b
−
exp(ς2mb Cb+Zbαmb )
(ym2 )
ρn
b
)]2 ≥ 0, unambigously.
(Q.E.D)
Proof of Proposition 2:
Let, ymb,2 = y
k
b,2 = yb,2.
⇒ βbΩ˜b = βbρb(log(yb,2)−log(yb,2))1−βbρb +
βbρb(3−2βb)(αkb−αmb )
(1−βbρb)(1−βb)2 =
βbρb(3−2βb)(αkb−αmb )
(1−βbρb)(1−βb)2 ≤ 0
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⇒ exp(βbΩ˜b) ≤ 1
⇒ yb,2
(
1− (1− γ)exp(βbΩ˜b)
)
≥ yb,2 (1− (1− γ))
⇒ âm2 ≥ âk2
(Q.E.D)
Proof of Corollory:
We can write that âm2 = â
k
2 = a2 iff
(i) y∗mb ≥ y∗kb and default penalty is big and trend growth difference is high for
different regimes or when
(ii) y∗mb ≤ y∗kb .
âm2 : V
m
b,2(a2) = V
k
b,2 and â
k
2 : V
s
b,2(a2) = V
k
b,2
⇒ γykb,2 = ymb,2
(
1− (1− γ)exp
[
βb(V˜
k − V˜ m)
])
⇒ γ y∗kb
y∗mb
= 1− (1− γ)
(
ykb,2
y∗mb
)D
exp(C)
⇒ γ y∗kb
y∗mb
+ (1− γ)exp(C)
(
ykb,2
y∗mb
)D
= 1
where, D = βρ
1−βρ > 1 and C = β(3−2β)(α
k−αm)
(1−βρ)(1−β)2 < 0
Note that the above equality will not be satified for the cases when, ykb,2 <
y∗kb < y
∗m
b and y
∗k
b < y
k
b,2 < y
∗m
b . The above will be satisfied for a higher γ or a
higher difference between αm and αm when y∗kb < y
∗m
b < y
k
b,2. Thus, if we have a
small default penalty, we should have y∗kb > y
∗m
b .
Further, if we compare the case when the borrower recieves same shocks for
the autarky when in either of the regimes we get,
γ
ykb
ymb
+ (1− γ)exp(C)
(
ykb
ymb
)D
= 1
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The above equation will never be satisfied if
ykb
ymb
< 1 or ykb < y
m
b , since γ, 1−γ
and exp(C) < 1. However, it is possible for the equality to hold for ykb
ymb
> 1 or
ykb > y
m
b .
(Q.E.D)
Default probability in period 1
Proof of Result 2:
In order to prove this result we make use of the properties of the error function.
Since, −1 ≤ erf(.) ≤ 1
⇒ 0 ≤ 1− erf(.) ≤ 2⇒ 0 ≤ 1−erf(.)
2
≤ 1
⇒ 0 ≤ δ2 ≤ 1.
Again, given a2 = y
∗
b
(
1− (1− γ)exp
(
βb
[
ρb(log(y
k
b,2)−log(y∗b ))
1−βbρb +
αkb−αmb
1−βbρ
3−2βb
(1−βb)2
]))
we take the derivative with respect to a2 to obtain,
1 =
∂y∗b
∂a2
[
1− (1− γ)exp(βbΩ˜b) + βbρb1−βbρb (1− γ)exp(βbΩ˜b)
]
⇒ ∂y∗b
∂a2
= 1[
(1−(1−γ)exp(βbΩ˜b)))+ βbρb1−βbρb (1−γ)exp(βbΩ˜b)
] = 1
1+(1−γ)exp(βbΩ˜b) 2βbρb−11−βbρb
≥ 0 if
ρbβb ≥ 12 , which shall be the case in our setup.
−δ′2(a2) =
−1
2y∗b,2ς
m
b
√
2
pi
exp
− log2
(
y∗b,2
(ymb,1)
ρbexp(2αmb )
)
2(ςmb )
2
 ∂y∗b,2
∂a2
< 0. (12)
where,
∂y∗b,2
∂a2
≥ 0 for all the values of σ.
(Q.E.D)
Debt threshold changes as the risk aversion of the borrower changes (refer to
39
fig A.2).
Figure A.2: ‘Indifference’ debt v.s. risk aversion
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let us say, ymb,1 = y
k
b,1. We already know that y
∗k
b =
a2
γ
and (y∗mb )
B−1(y∗mb −
a2) = (1− γ)(ykb )BeC(αk−αm) ≥ 0⇒ y∗mb ≥ a2.
Thus, we are in one of the two cases, (i) a2 ≤ y∗mb ≤ a2γ = y∗kb or (ii) a2 ≤
a2
γ
= y∗kb ≤ y∗mb . For an debt level a2, ym∗b,2 (a2) ≤ yk∗b,2(a2) whenever γ 7→ γ (where
γ is close to zero). In this scenario we can say, since the error and logarithmic
functions are monotonically increasing, that
ym∗b,2
(ymb,1)
ρbexp(2αmb )
≤ y
k∗
b,2
(ykb,1)
ρbexp(2αkb )
⇒ δm2 ≤ δk2 .
(Q.E.D)
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Abstract
A change in interest rate influences the cost of borrowing for the in-
vestors. This in turn affects the borrowing side of the economy. Domestic
economy of the emerging markets and international sovereign debt market,
such as those of Latin America and Asia, are affected by changes in the
U.S. monetary policy. In 1994, the U.S. monetary policy was tightened
that resulted in widening of sovereign spreads. In 1998, an opposite effect
took place after loosening of the monetary policy. A rise in U.S. rates
tends to increase the debt-service burden of the borrowing country, which
reduces their ability to repay. We present a model, which uses a pricing
kernel to evaluate risk and return in financial markets of a lending country
while embedding it in a model of sovereign default of a borrowing country.
Thus, we bring together two separate strands of literature and present a
holistic model of international finance, which evaluates how pricing of risk
affects the price of debt, spreads and behaviour of the borrowing country,
i.e., its ability to borrow and smooth consumption.
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1 Introduction
A change in the U.S. monetary policy or the world market influences the country
risk and cost of funds of developing countries like Latin America, Asia and East
Europe. It affects the debtor country’s ability to repay loans and to attract foreign
investors. In 1994 when the U.S. monetary policy tightened, the country spreads
widened in Latin America. In 1998, the reverse happened when the Fed eased its
monetary policy; the sovereign spreads decreased (Figure 1, Arora and Cerisola
(2001)). Data on Argentina show similar trend. The correlation between Fed fund
rate and the sovereign spreads is around 60 percent for the period between 1983-
2001 (Figure 2). In addition, some basic analysis illustrates that the U.S. Fed
fund rate has a positive and significant influence on the magnitude of sovereign
spread.
The key motivation of this paper is to study how choices and characteristics
of a lending country influence the real business cycles and domestic economy of
a borrowing country and the international sovereign debt market. Specifically,
we focus our attention to the case of the U.S. and Argentina. As a source of
funding, the prevailing world interest rate in the lending country influences not
only the borrowing country’s ability to borrow but also the default probability,
level of debt and mean spreads in the international sovereign debt market. For
instance, when times are bad, the borrowing country’s government might find it
difficult to roll over debt and seek new funding.
We introduce a model of international finance, which combines two sepa-
rate economic frameworks into one. We follow closely and extend the work
by Melino and Yang (2003), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008) and
Lizarazo (2012). Melino and Yang (2003) incorporates properties, such as mildly
pro-cyclical inter-temporal elasticity of substitution and strongly counter-cyclical
risk aversion in the framework with Epstein-Zin preferences for lenders. This
specification is very useful in the evaluation of risk and generating moments of
asset returns in the financial market. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) incorporate
endogenous default risk in an incomplete market setup. Recent models, such as
Arellano (2008) and Lizarazo (2012), on endogenous sovereign debt have man-
aged to explain real business cycles statistics for the borrower. While these two
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frameworks have successfully generated the economic outcomes from the view of
respective agents- borrower and lender, literature cries out for a model, which
can combine these two sides together to yield a holistic model of international
finance.
We develop a stochastic general equilibrium model of a small open economy
which borrows from the rest of the world in an international lending and bor-
rowing market. This paper extends the analysis of model on sovereign debt by
introducing a risk averse lending country, which faces uncertainty of future in-
come. The lending country’s wealth is determined solely by its own income shocks
and is not affected by the default decision of the borrowing country. The lending
and borrowing in the international debt market takes place between governments
of each country. They lend and borrow by issuance of bonds in the international
market. As the international debt contracts are not enforceable, the borrowing
government may choose to default. This results in an output penalty and exclu-
sion from the international financial market. The domestic agents have access to
the domestic financial markets, which are not integrated across countries. Thus,
the households or the private agents of a country do not have access to the for-
eign financial market. We assume that the decisions made by agents in the small
open economy do not influence fundamental variables (quantities) and prevailing
prices in the rest of the world.
The pricing kernel of the lending country is derived from state dependent
preferences and it is crucial in evaluation of risk. We use this pricing kernel in our
baseline economy and match data on real business cycle statistics of the borrowing
country, financial outcomes in the lending country and the international sovereign
debt market. We find that when lending country receives a higher (lower) income
shock, the contract on international lending charges a lower (higher) interest rate.
In addition, we observe higher issuance of debt when the borrowing or the lending
country receives a higher income shock. The paper also highlights the importance
of lending country’s characteristics by replacing a risk averse lending country with
risk neutral. This specification fails on all fronts. The default probability and
mean spread are very high as compared to the data and equity risk premium
puzzle remains unsolved. We also look at the standard model of sovereign debt,
which is unable to resolve equity risk premium puzzle, and thus the moments of
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asset return remain unaccounted for.
We find that the standard model with its pricing kernel has a property that
cannot match high spreads without counter-factually high default probabilities.
One explanation is that spread is completely tied to the default probability. In
order to match the spread, we need a theory without generating high default
probability. Since, the pricing of risk varies over cycles and the risk averse lending
country demands a risk premium, the price of debt has to be very different from
default probability. In standard models, variation of spread is explained by the
default probability. However, in the baseline economy of this paper, the variation
of spread is also driven by the pricing of risk, which are affected by the business
cycles of the lending country. Thus, we obtain high spreads with low default
probability. These findings are very striking given that we choose an i.i.d. instead
of correlated income process for the lending country.
Literature review.
Arora and Cerisola (2001) studies how changes in the U.S. monetary policy –
federal funds target rate – impact sovereign bond spreads in emerging economies
like Latin America, Asia and East Europe. They present empirical evidences
using secondary markets data1 to show that spreads widen in emerging economies
when U.S. monetary policy is tightened. In 1994 and then in 1998, a similar
but opposite instance happened. The U.S. monetary policy tightened in 1994,
which resulted in widened spreads. A rise in U.S. rates tends to increase the
debt-service burden of the borrowing country, which reduces the ability to repay.
Bernie et.al. (IMF, 2008) present empirical results in support of linkages between
the developed and emerging financial markets. In general, emerging economies
are influenced by the disturbances in the developed economies.
This paper marries two models together, wherein we will use more recent de-
velopment in the field of sovereign debt and equity risk premium puzzle. The aim
of this paper is to see how business cycle statistics of an emerging economy vary
as we incorporate explicitly lending country’s preferences. This paper enriches
the standard business cycle model under endogenous default by assuming lenders
to be risk averse and incorporating domestic and international financial markets.
1Merrill Lynch Global emerging markets spread
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In doing so, we calculate the financial and the real business cycle outcomes of
a borrowing country in a stationary recursive equilibrium with default risk. We
will also look at the (domestic) financial market outcomes of the lending country.
The economic literature has recently seen a lot of research in the field of
emerging economies and its debt. These papers study the choice of level of debt
and default decision by these economies. They focus on real business cycle mod-
els of international lending and borrowing under endogenous default decision.
Most of the literature explores the effects of the borrowing country’s characteris-
tics on these decisions. The important factors could be output shocks, political
stability, Hatchondo et al. (2009) etc. Some recent papers go beyond the bor-
rower’s characteristics to explore how lenders might affect the business cycles of
these emerging economies, which tend to behave quite differently from that in
the developed economies, Lizarazo (2012). In all these research papers, it has
been highlighted that the emerging economies have business cycles that are more
volatile, counter-cyclical rate of interest, which lags the cycles and the volatil-
ity of consumption is higher than the volatility of income, Neumeyer and Perri
(2005).
Another strand of literature has attempted at explaining the equity risk pre-
mium puzzle and match asset returns and other financial variable with data.
Equity risk premium is one of the most important financial figures used by in-
vestors for making investment decisions. A change in global interest rate might
lead to a change in the riskiness of government bonds. This can further affect the
returns on riskier assets, such as stocks, which should be reflected in change in
the equity risk premium. Researchers have been trying to explain it and match
it with data. This line of research has brought to light something important,
which is called as equity risk premium puzzle. The economic models with stan-
dard preferences have failed to explain the large equity risk premium observed
in data when the investors are risk averse. While equity risk premium puzzle
does not exist when the lenders are highly risk averse, many explanations have
come forth to illustrate shortcomings of these models with standard preferences.
Many attempts have been made using models with habit preferences, Epstein-Zin
preference etc. to account for mismatch between data and theory without much
success.
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Figure 1: Emerging Market Sovereign Spreads and U.S. Interest Rates
Source: Arora and Cerisola (2001)
Melino and Yang (2003) has highlighted that introducing state dependent
preferences with Epstein-Zin formulation of recursive utility will help resolve the
puzzle. They incorporate strongly counter-cyclical risk aversion and mildly pro-
cyclical inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to the Epstein Zin preferences.
The agents are sensitive to current state of economy. If a low state were realized
today, agents would invest in assets which pays a higher return if low state is
realized tomorrow and a low return if high state is realized tomorrow. However,
if a high state were realized today then the agents would not be as sensitive as in
the above case. They will invest in an asset, which pays similarly to either low
or high state realization tomorrow.
Section 2 introduces the model and the environment with a discussion on
agents and markets. It formally presents the agents’ problems and equilibrium
of this economy. Section 3 computes the model and discusses the quantitative
analysis. We report results from calibration in this section.
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Figure 2: Argentina Sovereign Spreads and U.S. Fed Fund Rate
Source: EMBI and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
2 The Model
We study the world economy, which consists of a small open economy and a rest of
the world. We follow the framework of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) and Arellano
(2008) to model default. We assume that the small open economy is small enough
compared to the rest of the world so its policies do not affect international interest
rates and consumption. It is the net borrower and rest of the world is the net
lender in the international debt market.
Time is discrete and infinite, t = {0, 1, 2, ...}. The lending and the borrowing
economies, i ∈ {l, b}, are inhabited by risk averse households of unit mass each
and are ruled by benevolent government. The households are identical within
each country and receive stochastic endowment stream every period. They have
access to the domestic financial market through risky equity market and the risk-
free bond market. The governments have access to the international debt market
and trade a one-period risky bond. This debt contract is not enforceable and
the borrowing government may choose to default on its debt obligation. The
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defaulting government is penalized with a fraction of its output immediately and
it remains in financial autarky for a certain period.
Households. The households in the borrowing country have CRRA preferences
over consumption, cb, while the households in the lending country have Epstein-
Zin preferences over consumption, cl. The households of the borrowing and the
lending country have access to the domestic capital market2. They can buy risky
equity, si, at a price, q
e
i and risk free debt, ai, at a price, q
rf
i . The equity
pays stochastic dividend, θi(yi), which is a function of the income realization
yi. Additionally, the households in the borrowing country receive a lump sum
intra-period transfer of goods, T , from its government.
The households in the borrowing country receives endowments yb. It follows
the AR(1) process,
log(y′b) = ρblog(yb) + 
′
b, (1)
where, the persistence parameter ρb is within the unit circle and the income
shocks ′b are i.i.d and normally distributed N(0, ς
2
b ). ςb is the standard deviation
of the income shocks
The households in the lending country receives income yl and its growth rate,
g˜′l, follows a Markov process such that
y′l = g˜
′
lyl, (2)
where the Markov chain is ergodic and g˜′l is positive.
The household in the borrowing country takes transfers T ′ as given. It is a
stochastic process, which is endogenously determined from government’s problem
discussed later. It follows a Markov process and depends on the state of the
economy, i.e. level of debt in the international debt market and income of the
borrowing and the lending countries. The Bellman equation for the household in
the borrowing country is given by
2Refer to the appendix for more details on the domestic market.
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Ub(wb, yb, T ) = max{s′b≥0,a′b≥0}
{ub(cb) + βbE [Ub(w′b, y′b, T ′)]} , (3)
where βb ∈ (0, 1) is the borrower’s discount factor and wb is its wealth and yb
is the income realization. The utility function is strictly increasing and concave,
i.e. u′b(.) > 0 and u
′′
b (.) < 0 and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. The
maximization is subjected to the budget constraint
cb + q
e
bs
′
b + q
rf
b a
′
b = wb (4)
and the law of motion
w′b = a
′
b + s
′
b [θ
′
b(y
′
b) + q
′
b
e] + T ′ (5)
The lending country is not affected by the borrowing country’s characteristics
as we assume a small open economy framework. The Bellman equation for the
household in the lending country is given by
Ul(wl, yl) = max{s′l≥0,a′l≥0}
[
c1−ϕll + βl
(
E
[Ul(w′l, y′l)1−γl]) 1−ϕl1−γl ] 11−ϕl (6)
where βl ∈ (0, 1) is the lender’s discount factor, wl is its wealth, yl is its income
realization, γl is its risk aversion and
1
ϕl
is its inter-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. The utility function is strictly increasing and concave, i.e. u′b(.) > 0
and u′′b (.) < 0 and satisfies the standard Inada conditions. The maximization is
subjected to the budget constraint
cl + q
e
l s
′
l + q
rf
l a
′
l = wl (7)
and the law of motion
w′l = a
′
l + s
′
l [θ
′
l(y
′
l) + q
′
l
e] (8)
We assume that the lending country is very big such that the default decision
of the borrowing country does not affect its consumption. We also assume that
βb < βl, so that small open economy b is the net borrower and rest of the world
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l is the net lender.
Given a transfers function, T , a recursive competitive equilibrium for an in-
dividual country i is given by a value function Ui, decision rules gsi and gai and
the pricing functions qei and q
rf
i such that,
(i) Given the pricing functions qei and q
rf
i , the value function Ui and the
decision rules gsi and g
a
i and solve the household’s problem.
(ii) Markets clear
s′i = g
s
i = 1
a′i = g
a
i = 0
(iii) The equilibrium assets’ price functions qei and q
rf
i are consistent with the
households optimization.
Government in the borrowing country. The government is benevolent and
maximizes the utility of its representative households. It smooths consumption
by trading a non-contingent bond, which pays a time- and state-invariant return.
It receives qd′ units of goods today and delivers d′units of goods tomorrow in
the international debt market. For each state of the economy (yb, yl, d), the
relationship between transfers T (yb, yl, d) and d′ is determined by
T = qd′ − d (9)
The state variables for the borrowing government are income shocks, yb and
yl, and the debt holding of the risky bond, d; and the state variable for the lending
government is yl. The aggregate income space is y = (yb,yl), the aggregate state
space for the borrowing country is (y,d) = (yb,yl,d) = Sb and the aggregate
state space for the lending country is yl = Sl. Let Π(y′,y) represent the income
transition matrix.
We denote the value function of the borrowing government as Vb(y,d). Let
V db (y) denote the value function after default and V
nd
b (y,d) be the value func-
tion after repayment. The recursive formulation of the borrowing government’s
problem is expressed as
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Vb(y,d) = max{V ndb (y,d), V db (y)}
When it chooses to default, it temporarily exits the international credit market
and redeems access with probability λ. The decision to default leads to loss of
output, ydb . The value function is,
V db (y) = ub(y
d
b ) + βb
∑
y′b
∑
y′l
[
(1− λ)V db (y′) + λV nd(y′,d′ = 0)
]
Π(y′,y)
If it chooses to repay the debt then the value function is,
V ndb (y,d) = max
d′
{
u(yb − d+ q.d′) + βb
∑
y′b
∑
y′l
Vb(y
′,d′)Π(y′,y)
}
The borrowing government faces the resource constraint
cb = yb + T
At the start of the period, the borrowing government takes the default de-
cision after observing the income shocks. If it decides to repay its debt, then
the borrowing government chooses d′ in order to maximize the utility subject to
the resource constraint. It takes the bond price schedule q(y,d′) as given. The
households in two countries choose the quantity of equity and risk-free assets
taking prices as given. All agents consume.
The default set of the borrowing government is characterized by the aggregate
income space y for which it finds optimal to default for a given level of debt d.
More precisely, D(y′,d′) is given by:
D(y′,d′) = {y′ ∈ Y : V nd(y′,d′) < V d(y)} (10)
The repayment set is defined as the A(y′,d′)
A(y′,d′) = {y′ ∈ Y : V nd(y′,d′) ≥ V d(y)} (11)
The value function of the lending government is Vl(s) and is given by
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Vl(yl) = max
cl
{
u(cl) + βl
∑
y′b
∑
y′l
Vl(y
′
l)Π(y
′,y)
}
The lending government faces resource constraint given by
cl = yl
Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium. A stationary recursive
competitive equilibrium for a world economy, which faces default risk in interna-
tional debt market, is a set of value functions Vb : Sb 7→ R and Vl : Sl 7→ R; policy
functions for the borrowing household gsb : Sb 7→ R, gab : Sb 7→ R and gcb : Sb 7→ R;
policy function for the borrowing government gdb : Sb 7→ R and transfers function
gT : Sb 7→ R; policies for the lending households gsl : Sl 7→ R, gal : Sl 7→ R and
gcl : Sl 7→ R; pricing functions qel ,qrfl , qeb ,qrfb and q; a stationary measure pi∗ such
that
(i) Given the pricing functions qel and q
rf
l , the policy functions g
l
s, g
l
a and g
l
c solve
the household’s problem in the lending country and
(ii) Given the pricing functions qeb and q
rf
b , the transfers function g
T , the policy
functions gbs, g
b
a and g
b
c solve the household’s problem in the borrowing country
and
(iii) Taking as given the borrowing government policy, gbd, households consump-
tion gbc satisfies the resource constraint.
(iv) Taking as given the risky bond price function q(y,d′), the governments pol-
icy functions gbd, the default set D(y
′,d′) and the repayment set A(y′,d′) satisfy
the borrowing government’s optimization problem.
(v) Bonds prices q(y,d′) incorporate the borrowing government’s default proba-
bilities and are consistent with lending government’s optimization.
(vi) The domestic goods, equity and risk free bond market and the international
risky bond markets clear
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s′b = g
s
b = 1 and s
′
l = g
s
l = 1
a′b = g
a
b = 0 and a
′
l = g
a
l = 0
(vii) The invariant probability measure is consistent with the stochastic income
process.
(viii) The equilibrium debt price function q(y,d′), asset price functions qeb(y,d
′),
qrfb (y,d
′), qel (yl) and q
rf (yl) are consistent with the optimization problems of the
borrowing country’s households, lending country’s households and the borrowing
government. The equilibrium in the international debt market implies that the
price of the risky bond for state (y,d) is,
q(y,d′) =
∑ ∑
(y′b,y′l)∈A′
Π(y′,y)Ml(y′l,yl) (12)
where, Ml(y′l,yl) = βl
(
c′l
cl
)−ϕl ( Vl(y′l)
R(Vl(y′l))
)ϕl−γl
, is the stochastic discount factor
of the lending household and R(.) is a function defining the certainty equivalence
of tomorrow’s utility.
In the domestic market of the borrowing country, the price of equity
qeb(yb) =
∑
y′b
Π(y′b,yb)(q
e
b(y
′
b) + y
′
b)Mb(y′b,yb)
where,Mb(y′b,yb) = βb
(
c′b
cb
)−γb
, is the stochastic discount factor of the borrowing
household. The price of risk free debt, qrfb , in the domestic market is
qrfb (yb) =
∑
y′b
Π(y′b,yb)Mb(y′b,yb)
In the lending country, the price of equity
13
qel (yl) =
∑
y′l
Π(y′l,yl)(q
e(y′l) + y
′
l)Ml(y′l,yl)
where, Ml(.) is the marginal rate of substitution.
The price of risk free debt
qrfl (yl) =
∑
y′l
Π(y′l,yl)Ml(y′l,yl)
Equity Premium and Spread. We follow the standard approach of Mehra
and Prescott (1985) to quantify the equity premium in the lending country. The
equity premium, EQl, is given as the difference between un-conditional return
on equity, Rel , and un-conditional return on risk-free debt, R
rf
l .
EQl = R
e
l −Rrfl (13)
Similarly, we quantify the financial variables for the borrowing country.
EQb = R
e
b −Rrfb (14)
The equity risk premium in the borrowing country, EQb, corresponds to the
difference between un-conditional return on equity, Reb, and un-conditional return
on risk-free debt of the borrowing country.
The spread,S, is the difference between un-conditional return on sovereign
bond, Rd and un-conditional return on risk-free debt, Rrfl . All details on un-
conditional returns are provided in the Appendix.
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Calibration and functional forms
We solve the model numerically and use quantitative results to discuss default,
financial features (for e.g. equity risk premium) and business cycle properties (for
e.g. interest rates spreads, output, and consumption) of this economy. We use
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parameters derived from the literature, Arellano (2008), for Argentina and from
combined sources, data and Mehra and Prescott (1985), for the U.S. economy.
They represent the borrowing and the lending countries in the model of this paper.
A period in the model refers to a quarter in data, which represents time-period
from 1983 : Q3 until 2001 : Q3.
Functional forms and parameters We use parameters from Arellano (2008),
Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Melino and Yang (2003) for the borrowing and the
lending country. We vary these parameters in order to answer how characteristics
of the borrowing and the lending countries change the model outcomes with
respect to data. To begin with, we adopt a specific baseline for the analysis. In
this setting, the lending country has state dependent recursive preferences while
the borrowing country has CES preferences, as considered in standard literature.
The lending country is risk averse when low-income state is realized and it is
risk neutral when high-income state is realized. The borrowing country is very
impatient and risk averse.
Table 1 lists all those exogenous benchmark parameters, which are taken from
Arellano (2008), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Melino and Yang (2003) and derived
from data. The risk free world interest rate is 0.8 percent, which matches the
quarterly yield on the five-year US Treasury bond. The probability of re-entry is
0.282, which matches 1.75 trade balance volatility3. Moreover, the output cost
after default is set at 0.969 of the average output, which captures 5.53 percent
debt service to GDP. Similar to Arellano (2008), we assume that default results
in direct output cost, y˜b, of the following form
f(yb) =

y˜b if yb >y˜b
yb otherwise.
For the borrowing country, we set the CRRA, γb = 2, and the discount factor
3As in Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), probability of redemption implies that the economy
cannot access international credit market for 2.5 years on average. Gelos et. al. (2003) reports
it to be around three years in data.
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at βb = 0.882. The output of the borrowing country follows an AR(1) process
with persistence and standard deviation set at ρb = 0.945 and ςb = 0.025, respec-
tively. In case of lending country, we use the environment and parameters for the
endowment process as presented in Mehra and Prescott (1985). The consumption
growth is calculated so that the average growth rate of per capita consumption
is 0.018, its standard deviation is 0.036. The first order serial correlation is -0.14,
which translates into probability 0.43 of remaining in same state. We incorporate
this parameter space and the stochastic discount factor from Melino and Yang
(2003) in order to account for financial variables, as observed for the lending
country’s actual data. Melino and Yang (2003) target the estimates of historical
average return on equity and risk free rate, which are at 7 percent and 0.8 per-
cent, respectively. The standard deviation of equity and risk free rate is 0.165
and 0.056, respectively. With these targets in mind Melino and Yang (2003) esti-
mate the rates on equity and risk free processes, i.e. values attained for different
income realizations. These processes are then linked to the stochastic discount
factor and the first order conditions with respect to equity and risk free bond.
The first order conditions are derived from maximization problem of the agents
subject to wealth accumulation constraint. They find specific parameter spaces
of discount factors, risk aversion parameters and inter-temporal elasticity of sub-
stitution parameters, which satisfies the first order conditions4 that match the
equity and risk free rate processes exactly. One such parameter space is used for
this paper. We set the lending country’s discount factor at 0.98, the risk aversion
parameter during recession is 23.25 and during boom it is 0.21, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution during recession is 2.1 and during boom, it is 2.98.
Discretization of shocks. We discretize the state space for the variables
as follows. There are 21 grids for borrower’s income yb, 2 grids for lender’s
consumption (income) growth rate g′l and 400 grids for debt. This particular
choice of grids are considered as we want to compare, later, the results using
the benchmark parameters and the parameters from Arellano (2008), Mehra and
Prescott (1985) and Melino and Yang (2003). Accordingly, the income space is
approximated using the procedure from Tauchen and Hussey (1991).
4Refer to the Appendix
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Parameter Description Value
δ Loss of output in autarky 0.969 E[yb]
λ Probability of re-entry 0.282
r∗ World interest rate 0.8%
Borrower
βb Discount factor 0.882
γb Risk aversion 2
ςb Standard deviation 0.025
ρb Persistence Transitory shock 0.945
Lender
βl Discount factor 0.98
γl Risk aversion {0.21, 23.25}
1
ϕl
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution {2.98, 2.1}
ςl Mean consumption growth 0.018
ρl Variance consumption growth 0.0012
pi Probability of remaining in same state 0.43
Table 1: Baseline Parameter values
3.2 Calibration results
In this section, we report actual and simulated quarterly business cycles for Ar-
gentina from 1983 until 2001. The quantitative predictions are obtained by sim-
ulating the model over time to obtain short run and long run statistics. For
short (or medium) run statistics, we consider 100 defaults events and 74 observa-
tions before the default. We report interest rate spread, output and consumption
around default episodes. We also look at the volatility and correlation between
these variables for the borrowing country. Then, we calculate the long-run av-
erage for interest rate spread, debt to output share and default probability. In
addition, we measure financial variables such as return on equity, return on risk
free bond, return on sovereign bond and equity risk premium.
Table 2 reports results on business cycle statistics and financial variables for
actual data in column 1 and the baseline economy in column 2. In order to isolate
the role of risk aversion, we also simulate the baseline under the assumption of
a risk neutral lending country while keeping rest of the parameters fixed. The
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results from this exercise are reported in column 3. In the last experiment,
results in column 4, we recalibrate the risk neutral lenders and match the default
probability of the baseline economy.
In the baseline economy, we build on Melino and Yang (2003) using a pricing
kernel, which helps resolve the equity risk premium puzzle and risk free rate
puzzle, for the lending country. The pricing kernel provides a good theory about
evaluation of risk in the lending country and international debt market as we
embed it in the model of sovereign debt and default. A resolution of risk free rate
puzzle ensures that the risk free rate in the lending country is low, as observed in
data. Low risk free rate enables lenders to access funds at low cost of borrowing
and invest in assets with higher return. The obvious choices are going to either
domestic equity market or international debt market, which pay a higher risk
premium.
The baseline economy focuses on specific structure - the borrowing and the
lending countries are risk averse and the borrowing country is very impatient. The
lending country is highly risk averse when the state of the economy is low while
it is risk neutral when the state of the economy is high. The risk aversion, which
is strongly counter cyclical, is set at 23.25 in low state and 0.21 in high state.
The inter temporal elasticity of substitution is mildly pro-cyclical but highly
responsive. It is set at 2.1 in low state and 2.98 in high state. The discount
factor for the lending country is set at 0.98 and for the borrowing country at
0.882.
The current state of the economy in lending country affects the investment
decision. As future is also important, a low-income state in the lending coun-
try today would encourage investors to invest in an asset, which promises a
higher payment when a low-income state realizes tomorrow. This asset could
pay relatively lower amount in higher income realization tomorrow. The lending
country demands compensation during recession, as they are more risk averse.
A high-income state today, which punctuates risk neutrality, does not highlight
differences of such a magnitude in future particularly.
These features - strongly counter cyclical risk aversion and mildly pro-cyclical
inter temporal elasticity of substitution -generate a pricing kernel, which is more
accurate in evaluation of risk and return. The return on equity, 7.01 percent, is
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comparatively much higher than the risk free return, 0.80 percent, in the lending
country. At these levels, the model matches the data very well with respect to
equity risk premium and risk free rate (puzzles). The equity risk premium is
around 6.21 percent and the risk free rate is low. The return on risky sovereign
bond, 15.23 percent, issued by the borrowing country is higher than the return
from equity market in the lending country. Here, we observe a low default rate,
4.43 percent, and a moderately high debt issuance as a share of output, 7.67
percent. These two effects, together, result in a high long-run mean spread,
14.43 percent, which is closer to the data. In medium (or short) run, around
default episodes, the model over estimates the mean spread, 53.31 percent, as
compared to 28.6 percent in data.
When the lender is risk neutral with CES preferences and the borrower is
very impatient, with the discount factor set at 0.882, we are in a very different
economy. The return on borrowing country’s sovereign bond, 2.74 percent, is
higher than the return on equity, 2.04 percent, in the lending country. Moreover,
return on equity is same as return on risk free bond in lending country. Thus,
the equity risk premium remains unresolved in this economy. These returns in
various markets, international and domestic, leads to high debt issuance as a
share of output, 16.49 percent, high default rate, 16.94 percent and thus a very
high long run mean spread, 16.43. The medium run mean spread, 37.22 percent,
is an overestimate of the data. This variation of the economy misses the data on
several points for both, the borrowing and the lending country.
We re-calibrate the above economy, which has a risk neutral lending country
and a patient borrowing country. The borrowing country has a discount factor
set at 0.953. In this economy, the asset markets have very similar returns. The
return on equity and risk free return in the lending country is 2.04 percent and the
return on borrowing country’s sovereign bond is 2.06 percent. The differences in
these returns highlight moderate debt issuance as a share of output, 5.96 percent,
and default rate, 2.99 percent. These two opposing effects lead to a low long run
mean spread, 3.52 percent, which does not match data. Moreover, the returns
on different assets do not resolve the equity risk premium puzzle. This model
economy underestimates the medium (short) run mean spread, 23.63 percent,
which is result contrary to the one in baseline model.
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The model presented in this paper highlights the role of risk averse lending
country. In three experiments, we simulate the economy to see how risk aversion
alone changes results. Under the baseline economy, a low default probability at
4.43 is associated with high spread at 14.43 over the business cycle. However,
in column 3 and column 4, the default probability and spread move one-to-one.
When the preferences are changed from the baseline to a risk neutral lending
country with everything else same, we get a high spread at 16.43 because default
probability is high at 16.94. We observe this behaviour as the pricing of risk is
incorrect. The pricing kernel does not react much to the level of debt. The bor-
rowing country borrows a lot and tend to default a lot. When we recalibrate the
model with risk neutral lending country to match the default probability we find
that the spread is low at 3.52. This shows that the standard theory is missing an
important link between spread and default probability. The relationship between
spread and default probability is a necessary ingredient in determining the price
of sovereign bonds.
All three model economies do well with respect to other business cycle statis-
tics of the borrowing country. They are in line with empirical findings on emerging
economies. The volatility of consumption is higher than the volatility of income,
consumption is pro-cyclical and spread is counter cyclical. However, the equity
risk premium, in the borrowing country’s domestic financial market, is low. It
stands at around 0.20 percent. It is worth reminding readers that the low equity
risk premium could be attributed to the preference of the agent in the borrow-
ing country. Our best guess is that if CES preference was replaced by the state
dependent Epstein-Zin preference, we will be able to get a higher equity risk
premium. The equity risk premium for emerging economies is quite difficult to
estimate empirically as the actual data is available for short periods and it is
highly volatile. Damodaran (2016) reports the annual equity risk premium of
Argentina at 9.16 percent. He estimates Argentina’s annual equity risk premium
for 2010-12 using the method of relative equity market standard deviations un-
der the assumption that the equity risk premium for the U.S. is 6 percent. This
method uses annualized standard deviations of the S&P 500 and the MERVAL
index in the U.S and Argentina. The key underlying assumption of this method
is a linear relationship between equity risk premiums and equity market standard
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deviations. Salomons and Grootveld (2003) reports the average monthly equity
risk premium for Argentina from 1976 until 2001 at 3.16 percent. Other studies,
which estimate equity risk premium for emerging economies, and specifically for
Argentina, find it to be higher than the developed countries.
Figure 3 plots the bond price schedules faced by the borrowing country with
different preferences of the lending country. The bond price schedules in panel (a)
and panel (b) corresponds to the borrowing country’s income shocks 10 percent
below and above the trend. The bond price schedules display standard properties
across lending country’s preferences, i.e. it is an increasing function of assets or
higher level of debt is associated with lower bond price (or, higher interest rates).
The figure displays the baseline economy under two scenarios: high and low-
income realizations for the lending country (risk averse (high) and risk averse
(low)). When the borrowing country receives a high-income shock, it can choose
from a set of contract, which offers lower interest rates, as compared to when it
receives a low-income shock. If the lending country also receives a high-income
shock, and thus almost risk neutral, contracts with lower interest rates and higher-
level debts are available in the international debt market. If, however, it receives
a lower-income shock, higher interest rate is charged for the same level of debt.
In case of a risk neutral lending country, a lower interest rate is offered, when
compared with the state dependent (with high-income realization today) lending
country, at lower levels of debt. This finding is in line with the description of the
state dependent preferences of the lending country, which chooses different assets
depending on current income realization.
Figure 4 presents the saving function of the borrowing country under different
characteristics of the economic agents. The level of debt, d′, is higher when the
borrowing country is in boom5. Inn panel (a), high-income state of the borrowing
country, under persistent income, ensures repayment of debt. On the contrary,
recessions in the borrowing country limits the capacity to borrow in the interna-
tional debt market. A high level of debt, d′, is issued for high level of initial debt,
d, when the lending country is risk neutral and the borrowing country is very
impatient. The debt level, d′, is only slightly lower when the lending country has
counter-cyclical risk aversion and pro-cyclical inter temporal elasticity of substi-
5Higher debt corresponds to a high negative value on the x-axis and the y-axis of Figure 4.
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tution. Risk aversion has one of the direct dampening impact on debt issuance. It
is noteworthy that debt issuance, d′, is lower during recession than during boom
in the lending country. Moreover, the re-calibrated economy with risk neutral
lending country allows lower debt issuance, d′, when the initial debt level, d, is
already very high, as compared to the other preference specifications. In panel
(b), the borrowing country’s income is below the trend. Here, the borrowing and
lending does not take place at higher levels of initial debt. However, when the
initial debt level is not so high, the debt issuance depends on the lending coun-
try’s preferences. Higher level of debt is issued with state dependent preferences
during boom in the lending country. Similar level of debt is observed in case of
a risk neutral lending country. However, in case of re-calibrated economy with
risk neutral lending country and the economy with state dependent preferences
during recession in the lending country, the debt issuance is much lower.
The next step involves further analysis by using the model in this paper as
the starting point. An extension would involve looking at the returns on equity,
returns on bond and equity risk premium in the borrowing country’s domestic
financial markets when default episodes occur. These are expected to be much
different from the long run average as default affects the output of the borrowing
country, though that of the lender remains unchanged in this model. Currently,
it is difficult to analyse complete (full) influence of lender’s characteristics on
borrowing country’s decisions due to huge size of the modelling data (matrices)
and limited states for lending country’s income. One possibility is to extend the
analysis from an i.i.d. income process to a Markov income process and allow for
some correlation between the incomes of the borrowing and the lending countries.
4 Conclusion
The real and financial markets of small open economies are vulnerable to changes
in interest rates of the large open economies. Periods like in 1994 and 1998 had
been a very clear indication that the Latin American, as well as Asian, economies
were affected by changes in the monetary policy of the U.S. and hence its interest
rates. We present a model, which uses a pricing kernel to evaluate risk (and
return) in financial markets while embedding it in a model of sovereign default.
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In doing do, we bring together, two separate strands of literature, and present a
holistic model of international finance.
The first strand sets its attention on the financial markets of the developed
countries, such as the U.S. The pricing kernel, which we derive from state depen-
dent preferences of the lending country, enables us to resolve the puzzle associ-
ated with equity risk premium. Melino and Yang (2003) emphasizes the role of
(moderately) pro-cyclical inter temporal elasticity of substitution and (strongly)
counter-cyclical risk aversion in resolving it. These preferences affect the choices
that lending country makes while investing in assets, such as domestic equity, in-
ternational sovereign bond etc. Even though, portfolio allocation is not the focal
point of this paper, we show that the investment decisions of investors depend
on various aspects, such as income shocks in two countries, characteristics of the
borrowing and the lending country etc.
In order to align with the aim of this paper we look at how lending country
might influence the sovereign debt market and the domestic economy of the bor-
rowing country. This brings us to the second strand of literature, which focuses
on the endogenous default model for emerging economies, such as Argentina.
These models have been successful, largely, in explaining business cycle statistics
of emerging economies when contracts in the international lending and borrowing
market are unenforceable.
We find that the model presented in this paper, after incorporating some key
features, not only matches data concerning the real business cycle statistics of
the borrowing country but also assesses the risk very well for the lending country.
We observe that state dependent preferences are key in evaluating risk more ac-
curately. We also find that when lending country receives a higher (lower) income
shock, the contract on international lending charges a lower (higher) interest rate.
In addition, we observe higher issuance of debt when the borrowing or the lending
country receive a higher income shock.
Risk neutral preferences, under similar conditions, fail to explain the observed
statistics for both- the borrowing and the lending country. The default proba-
bility, mean debt to output ratio and mean spread are very high as compared
to the data. Moreover, the puzzle on equity risk premium remains unsolved.
Re-calibrating the model with risk neutral lending country by incorporating a
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patient borrower, as in the standard literature, explain the business cycle statis-
tics for the borrowing country. However, re-calibrating the parameters does not
allow the model to explain the asset markets in the lending country.
The three economies in this paper illustrate that the baseline economy’s
spread is very different from the default probability. The standard model can
generate huge spreads only with a high default probability. We have established
evaluation of risk, which changes with the business cycles of the lending country.
The level of spread is different from the default probability due to existence of
risk premium. Thus, an accurate pricing kernel is very important in accounting
for risk in the international debt market.
The model presented in this paper is the first attempt in bringing features of
lending and the borrowing country explicitly, while accounting for statistics of
each of the economies together. This paper has successfully highlighted the im-
portance of lending country’s characteristics in defining not only the international
sovereign debt market but also the domestic economy of the borrowing country.
Thus, the model in this paper is very useful as the starting point for any future
analysis, which has an intention to investigate a research question pertaining to
international finance, specifically to international debt market.
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Data Risk averse Risk neutral Risk neutral
Lender Lender Re calibrated
Parameters
βb - 0.88 0.88 0.95
Default episodes
Output (Yb) -14.21 -13.23 -13.50 -12.59
Consumption (Cb) -16.01 -13.07 -13.23 -12.45
Rate of interest spread (S) 28.6 53.31 37.22 23.63
Standard dev
σ(Y ) 7.78 5.81 5.25 5.79
σ(C) 8.59 7.14 7.13 6.28
σ(S) 5.58 20.91 17.91 5.76
Correlations
ρ(C, Y ) 0.98 0.89 0.86 0.97
ρ(S, Y ) -0.88 -0.15 -0.69 -0.33
ρ(S,C) -0.89 -0.28 -0.66 -0.40
Mean spread 10.25 14.43 16.43 3.52
Mean Debt/Output - 7.67 16.49 5.96
Default probability 3 4.43 16.94 2.99
EQb - 0.20 0.20 0.21
Rd - 15.23 2.74 2.06
EQl 6 6.21 0.00 0.00
Rel - 7.01 2.04 2.04
Rrfl - 0.80 2.04 2.04
Table 2: Data and Model
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(a) High income realization for borrower
(b) Low income realization for borrower
Figure 3: Bond Price Schedule
26
(a) High income realization for borrower
(b) Low income realization for borrower
Figure 4: Saving function
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5 Appendix
Household’s problem in lending country with Epstein-Zin preferences.
In the section we use time based subscripts in order to illustrate the importance
of state dependent preferences for the lender (also, subscript ’l’ is removed for
simplicity). The household’s problem with Epstein-Zin preferences in the lending
country can be written as follows:
Ut(wt, yt) = max{st+1≥0,at+1≥0}
[
c1−ϕtt + βt
(
E
[Ut(wt+1)1−γt]) 1−ϕt1−γt ] 11−ϕt
subjected to following constraints
ct + q
e
t st+1 + q
rf
t at+1 = wt+1
the law of motion of wealth, where θ(yt+1) = yt+1
wt+1 = at+1 + st+1
[
θ(yt+1) + q
e
t+1
]
and the law of motion of income with g˜t+1 as growth rate
yt+1 = g˜t+1yt
The first order conditions w.r.t st+1 gives
qet = Et
[
βt
c
−ϕt+1
t+1
c−ϕtt
(R (Ut+1)γt−ϕt U−γt+ϕt+1t+1 ) (qet+1 + yt+1)
]
(15)
where, Rt (Ut+1) =
[
Et
(U1−γtt+1 )] 11−γt . Assume that the price is homogenous
of degree one then qet = q
eyt. Also, a recursive competitive equilibrium of goods
market implies g˜t+1 =
yt+1
yt
= ct+1
ct
. Thus,
qet = Et
[
βtg˜
1−ϕt+1
t+1 y
ϕt−ϕt+1
t
(R (Ut+1)γt−ϕt U−γt+ϕt+1t+1 ) (qet+1 + 1)] (16)
In a special case of this general specification, if ϕt = ϕt+1 and γt = γt+1
then the above equation reduces to the standard price equation.
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qet = Et
[
βg˜−ϕt+1
( Ut+1
R (Ut+1)
)−γ+ϕ (
qet+1 + 1
)]
(17)
where, βg˜−ϕt+1
(
Ut+1
R(Ut+1)
)−γ+ϕ
is the ’stochastic’ marginal rate of substitution.
Similarly, the first order conditions w.r.t at+1 gives
qrft = Et
[
βt
c
−ϕt+1
t+1
c−ϕtt
(R (Ut+1)γt−ϕt U−γt+ϕt+1t+1 )
]
(18)
In a special case, eq(17) is given by
qrft = Et
[
βg˜−ϕt+1
( Ut+1
R (Ut+1)
)−γ+ϕ]
(19)
Here on, we follow the notations used in the paper, i.e. drop time subscripts
, t.
Domestic Capital Market of the lending country. The domestic capital
markets comprises of equity and risk free debt. We have used a variation of the
Mehra and Prescott (1985) to calculate the returns for each of these investments.
In discreet case, the price of equity, qel (yl), is rewritten as
qel (yl) =
∑
y′l
Π(y′l,yl)(q
e
l (y
′
l) + y
′
l)Ml(y′l,yl)
where, Ml(.) is the marginal rate of substitution. The realized return on equity
is given by
rel (y
′
l,yl) =
[
qel (y
′
l) + y
′
l
qel (yl)
− 1
]
The equilibrium in the domestic market implies that the conditional return on
the equity is R˜el (yl) and the un-conditional return is R
e
l
R˜el (yl) =
∑
y′l
Π(y′l,yl)r
e
l (yl′,yl) (20)
29
Rel =
∑
yl
Π˜(yl)R˜
e
l (yl) (21)
The price of risk free debt, qrfl (yl), is
qrfl (yl) =
∑
y′l
Π(y′l,yl)Ml(y′l,yl)
The equilibrium in the domestic risk-free bond market implies that the un-
conditional return on the risk-free bond Rrfl is given as
Rrfl =
∑
yl
Π˜(yl)
[
1
qrfl (yl)
− 1
]
(22)
Domestic Capital Market of the borrowing country. The domestic capital
markets comprises of equity and risk free debt. We use a variation of the Mehra
and Prescott (1985) to calculate the returns for each of these investments. The
price of equity, qeb(y), is
qeb(yb) =
∑
y′b
Π(y′b,yb)(q
e
b(y
′
b) + y
′
b)Mb(y′b,yb)
where, Mb(.) is the marginal rate of substitution of the borrowing country’s
households. The return on equity for an income realization is given by
reb(y
′
b,yb) =
[
qeb(y
′) + y′
qeb(y)
− 1
]
The equilibrium in the domestic market implies that the conditional return on
the equity is R˜eb and the un-conditional return is R
e
b
R˜eb(yb) =
∑
y′b
Π(y′b,yb)r
e
b(y
′
b,yb) (23)
Reb =
∑
yb
Π˜(yb)R˜
e
b(yb) (24)
The price of risk free debt, qrfb (y), is
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qrfb (yb) =
∑
y′b
Π(y′b,yb)Mb(y′b,yb)
The equilibrium in the domestic risk-free bond market implies that the expected
return on the risk-free bond Rrfb is given as
Rrfb =
∑
yb
Π˜(yb)
[
1
qrfb (yb)
− 1
]
(25)
The price of government debt, q(y,d), is
q(y,d) =
∑ ∑
(y′b,y′l)∈D
Π(y′,y)Ml(y′l,yl) (26)
The equilibrium in the domestic risk-free bond market implies that the expected
return on the risk-free bond Rd is given as
Rd =
∑
yb
∑
yl
Π˜(y)
[
1
q(y,d)
− 1
]
(27)
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